Too often the examination of vetoes is limited to looking at the cases where negotiations between the president and Congress breakdown and a veto is issued. Veto Rhetoric provides exciting new evidence on veto threats by examining a rich, original dataset of presidential statements of administration policy in addition to narrative evidence based on archival research at numerous presidential libraries. Scholars and students interested in the presidency, Congress, and the policymaking process will all benefit from reading this valuable contribution.
While veto threats have a long history, presidents have come to be more reliant on this bargaining tool in the last few decades. Veto Rhetoric therefore serves as a nice companion to Sam Kernell's classic study, Going Public, which documented a similar trend with regards to presidential public appeals. Kernell's current study will no doubt once again lead presidential scholars to rethink how they understand and conceptualizing presidential-congressional relations.
I have long been intrigued by the tradeoffs between the credibility and flexibility of commitments, in particular, and I haven't seen anything as clear as Veto Rhetoric's discussion in the economics or game theory literatures.